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According to a leading scholar of management James Brian Quinn,'"The capacity to manage human intellect—and to transform intellec-tual output into a service or a group of services embodied in a prod-uct—is fast becoming the critical executive skill of this era." Contrast
that with the assertion by the pointy-haired boss of the Dilbert cartoon that his
company's success will be driven by "redesigning processes to enable enterprise
integration of knowledge resources and tools." Tbe first is a serious, thoughtful,
and eminently reasonable statement of a belief in the transformation of manage-
ment. The second is a caricature of that belief, subsequently doused by Wally's
response, "Is it okay if I do nothing?" Leave it to Scott Adams and his alter egos
to gut the sanctity from the latest management fad. Nevertheless, any executive
attempting to deal with the reality of knowledge management is faced with a
cold hard fact—few know what they are doing when it comes to the manage-
ment of their firm's knowledge base. Most, like Wally, hope to get away by doing
nothing. Provided their knowledge management is not measurable in terms of
business outcomes, they can indeed do so. However, they will not be able to get
away with it for much longer. While knowledge itself is difficult to measure, it
does have a clear impact on business outcomes. More critically, there are good
proxies in terms of innovative outputs that can be used to measure whether
management is doing a good or poor job of managing their firm's knowledge
base.
This research was supported by grants from the Centre for Corporate Change at the Australian
Graduate School of Management, the Australian Research Council and AT Kearney. We have benefrted
greatly from comments and suggestions from participants at seminars at the AG5M, INSEAD, Univer-
sitatJena,Universitat Hamburg, Stockholm School of Economics, the 1999 EGOS Conference at
Warwick University, the 2000 Organization Science Conference and the 2000 Strategic Management
Society Conference.
CAUFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL 44, NO. 4 SUMMER 2002 129
Knowledge Management: Philosophy. Processes, and Pitfalls
The need for knowledge management has grown from the recognition
that inflexible organizational structures cannot cope when the ground is shifting
as rapidly as it does in today's markets. The problem faced by managers is that as
customers and markets have changed, the organizational components that need
to be managed have become less and less visible. Consider an analogy with
physics. Newtonian physics concerned itself with visible phenomena—an object
falling in a vacuum or the orbit of a body in frictionless space. Over time physi-
cists found that such simple models could not explain more complex phenom-
ena and, with the concurrent development of better measurement instruments,
began delving into the subatomic realm of neutrons and electrons. This was
sufficient to keep people busy for a while and led to the development of nuclear
power plants, medical instrumentation, and, of course, weapons. However, this
reached its limit as more thorny phenomena were studied and more complex
instrumentation was developed. Physicists soon found themselves operating in
the mystical realm of strings, dark matter, and Einstein's "spooky action at a
distance." Few, if any, of these concepts can be articulated in anything but sets of
equations and their direct measurement is well nigh impossible. Instead, physi-
cists rely on indirect measurement of specific event outcomes from which it can
be inferred that one or other model is correct.
The evolution of physics from the study of observable phenomena with
tangible parts to unobservable (but relevant) intangible phenomena with prob-
abilistic parts parallels the demands now facing managers. Management
researchers are faced with the added complication that we have not been able
to do sophisticated experimentation on organizations. Executives are now con-
fronted with a very serious and currently "unmanageable" imperative—the man-
agement of a completely invisible asset—a task made all the more difficult by the
tried-and-tested managerial maxim that you cannot manage what you cannot
measure. This fact is complicated further by the confusion between data man-
agement and knowledge management perpetrated by IT consultants selling
knowledge management systems. Data is information. Knowledge, or know-how,
has to do with the process of learning, understanding, and applying information. As the
eminent philosopher Gilbert Ryle states, "learning how or improving in ability is
not like learning that or acquiring information."^ Such a distinction is also
reflected in Pfeffer and Sutton's concept of the "knowing-doing gap," which
highlights the distinction between "knowing" something and converting what is
known into action.' For them it is not enough to know what to do; the challenge
is in understanding how to use knowledge to generate results. The importance of
the data-knowledge distinction is emphasized in Davenport et al.'s recent work,
where they emphasize that although organizations are well equipped to access
data, "all too rarely is that data sifted into the sort of knowledge that can inform
business decisions and create positive results."''
According to Teece, the competitive advantage of a firm lies in its "ability
to create, transfer, assemble, integrate, and exploit knowledge assets."^ This is
a feat that is both chaUenging and mystifying for managers, as illustrated by
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Ruggles's survey uncovering that managers face difficulties not in accessing
knowledge, but in utilizing knowledge in decision making and in embodying
knowledge in products/services and processes.** True knowledge, by definition,
is non-codified. As soon as it becomes codified and transmittable it ceases to be
knowledge and becomes data. It can only become new knowledge when com-
bined in some unique way leading to an actionable outcome. It is this funda-
mental and embedded characteristic of knowledge that makes its management
so frustratingly difficult.
The trouble that managers face in developing and integrating knowledge
management practices is that an effective knowledge management system is in
itself a complex combination of a series of organizational subsystems which are
themselves complex (and only one of which has a strong information technol-
ogy dimension). A firm's knowledge management system embodies four main
components:
• a database subsystem that allows managers and employees to share the
right information in a timely and efficient fashion;
• an organizational language subsystem that allows individuals to understand
the meaning of things (this can include understanding information by
decoding what they receive from the database, codifying their own
knowledge into readily usable data for other users and the systemic lan-
guage that allows people in an organization to recognize deeper meaning
behind verbal and physical communication);
• a networking subsystem that allows individuals to retrieve and acquire
information and knowledge from sources both internal and external to
the firm (networking subsystems operate on both formal and informal
levels); and
• the transfer subsystem whereby systemic knowledge is either directly trans-
ferred between individuals or new knowledge is created by the unique
combination of information with the individual's experience base (in
many ways, this is the most critical subsystem).
If managed in a way that facilitates knowledge development, sharing, and uti-
lization, the ultimate outcome of this combination of subsystems is greater inno-
vative output, either in terms of new products or services or better operational
performance.
Our research examines firms' knowledge systems and the impact that
they have on the ability of the organization to enhance innovation and financial
performance from these underlying subsystems. In its general form, our research
surveys the knowledge management processes of 317 firms across a wide range
of consumer, industrial, service, and manufacturing sectors using a self-comple-
tion questionnaire (the survey research). This work allows us to paint a generic
picture of the relationship between networking, knowledge creation, innova-
tion, and financial and market performance. In its specific form, our research
investigated the knowledge management systems of six firms from the following
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F I G U R E I . The Process of Knowledge Creation and Innovation
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sectors: advertising, business services, executive search, legal services, engineer-
ing design, and automobile industries. This was done using a combination of
internal surveys and structured interviews (the case research). In both forms,
the questionnaires and interviews covered a range of concepts that were central
to organizational knowledge management, such as formal and informal
networking, absorptive capacity,' quality of problem solving,^ and innovation.'
Our relatively simple approach provides a clear framework for thinking
about knowledge in the context of firm performance. Firms need not necessarily
measure knowledge directly to manage it. They can measure knowledge indi-
rectly by measuring certain firm processes (i.e., problem solving and decision
making) or outcomes (i.e., innovative outputs) that serve as proxies for knowl-
edge creation.
The General Process of Knowledge Creation and Innovation
A simple way of thinking about the knowledge-creation process is with
a sources-uses-outcomes approach, as exhibited in Figure 1. This approach looks
at knowledge creation in three ways. First, there must be sources of information
and know-how on which an individual's knowledge base is built. These sources
arise from the internal and external network opportunities open to the individ-
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ual attempting to generate and utilize a knowledge base. Operationally, it is
measured by the level of information and knowledge that is acquired from an
individual's formal and informal networking activities. Second, the organization
and individual must have absorptive capacities for internalizing and integrating
the information and know-how being extracted from the "network" of contacts
and sources. According to Cohen and Levinthal, absorptive capacity is the ability
to recognize, absorb, and assimilate new external information/" We adapt the
authors' conceptual definitions to derive the following measures: active informa-
tion and knowledge sourcing, recording and sharing, and knowledge accumula-
tion behaviors (such as participating in conferences, updating skills through
training and self-learning, and keeping abreast of the latest technology). In
addition to individual-level measures, organizational-level measures are also
obtained by investigating the extent to which the firm has policies and proce-
dures that encourage and develop individuals' absorptive capacity. Third,
because knowledge is "aaionable," it must be created through application.
Hence, the catalyst of the knowledge-creation process is the organizational prob-
lem-solving context in which we investigate whether the acquired information
and know-how influences the quality ofthe decision-making process. Specifically,
we look at whether information and knowledge is utilized in decision making
to generate higher levels of comprehensiveness (more thorough analysis of
options), creativity (application of novel solutions), consensus (shared commit-
ment to implement chosen options), and new knowledge (new ideas, insights,
better problem-solving processes, and new ways of thinking).
From this process, the organization puts itself in a position to generate
knowledge-based outcomes; i.e., innovation. We define innovation as a mixture
of process and product outputs that include new or modified produas and ser-
vices, patents, new marketing techniques, new managerial tools and administra-
tive processes, licenses, and wider "thought leadership" (represented by things
like presentations at conferences and publications). It is these outputs—and not
the simple fact that know-how is created—that generate better financial and
sales performance. Performance is measured as three-year market share, profits,
profit growth, and sales growth (all relative to competitors).
Another characteristic of this approach is its recognition of the environ-
mental milieu in which knowledge creation is taking place. There are two con-
texts that are important. The first is the simple market/industry context. This is
most critical in determining basic structural factors that might affect the pool
of available knowledge and innovation as well as the networking limitations.
The context provides benchmarks for actual and potential innovative and mar-
ket/financial performance. The second context is the information and know-how
context. Certain business environments will have different information and
knowledge structures in terms of the codifiability, teachability, observability,
complexity, and cross-functionality of know-how and information." For exam-
ple, a legal firm tends to operate in a world with observable, teachable, and
funaion-specific precedents that are driven by the nature of the legal system.
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F I G U R E 2 . Performance, Knowledge Creation, Absorption, and Networking
Sources
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B. The greater individual and organizational ability to absorb information and know-
how, the more new information and know-how is acquired and the better is the
basis for decision making.
This might be contrasted with a different world in which, say, an advertising
agency operates, where knowledge is more tacit and experiential.
Figure 2 shows a stage-by-stage examination of the 317 firms that
responded lo a mail survey.'^ The five sets of columns represent ranked group-
ings for each fifth of the sample based on the measure shown on the horizontal
axis, with the set of columns for the top fifth of the sample displayed on the
right hand side of each chart. The height of each column represents an index
for the dependent measure whose name is given in the legend. The index sets
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F I G U R E 2 . Performance, Knowledge Creation, Absorption, and Networking ('continued)
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C. The more effective decision making (in terms of the 3Cs) that is applied to a
larger stock of information and knowledge, the more new knowledge is created.
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Note: The constructs are as follows: Forma! Neivtorhng, Informal Nerworking; Information Acquisitjon—5lock of information acquired from
networking Know-How Acquisition—Stock of know-how sources acquired from networking/nd/viduoMbsorpOvr Capaaiy (AC), Organizatior]al
Absorptive Capacity (AC); Comprehensiveness^Comprehensiveness of decision making; Consensus—Consensus used in decision making
Crectivlry—Creativrty brought to bear m the decision making process; New Knowledge created from decision making; /nnowHion—Index of
innovative outputs.Two performance measures are presented—ROA (Retum on Assels Relative to Competitors) and Market Share. For
example, in reading the last box Ft indicates that the bottom one-f fth of innovators has a market share 36% below that of the top one-fifth.
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the measure for the lowest fifth of the sample to 1.0 and scales the others in
proportion. For example, in "Sources" the top fifth of the sample based on our
measures of "Formal Networking" clearly outperforms the bottom fifth on the
three measures of "Information Acquisition," "Know-How Acquisition," and
"Innovation." The indices for these three measures (column heights) are approx-
imately 1.35—that is, 35% greater than for the bottom fifth of the sample. The
point of the exerdse is to show that—as one progresses through the process of
sourcing to use to outcomes—firms doing the best sourcing with the best absorp-
tion with the best decision-making processes are the most innovative and the
top financial and market performers. We have eschewed statistical measures for
simplicity. However, the picture presented is confirmed by more sophisticated
analysis.*'
Block A of the figure shows thai the greater the level of formal and infor-
mal networking, the greater the level of information and know-how stock avail-
able to the firm.'" Our definition of formal networking includes the use of
formal data systems and hence accounts for the database subsystem discussed
earlier. All told, the firms with the least formal and informal networking have
know-how and information sources that are 30-40% below the best one-fifth of
firms. Information and know-how stock represent the sources of data, informa-
tion and knowledge resident in other sources (other people, consultants, adver-
tising agencies, research centers, and so on). Block B shows that the firm's and
individual's ability to absorb knowledge and information is also critical to gener-
ating a solid base for new knowledge creation. The top fifth of firms and individ-
uals in terms of absorptive capacity significantly outperform all others in terms
of infor'mation and know-how generated from external and internal sources
and also in terms on new knowledge created. Block C examines the relationship
between the stock of available information and knowledge and the decision-
making performance of firms and their ability to create new knowledge. Firms
with the largest available stocks of information and knowledge are more likely
to create new knowledge predominantly through the level of comprehensive-
ness and creativity of their decision-making. What is interesting is that informa-
tion stocks are more important to new knowledge creation than knowledge
stocks. This follows from the fact that new knowledge is something available to
the firm through its actions, while knowledge embodied in other external and
internal sources may be less readily applied to decision-making. Block D shows
that firms that create the most new knowledge are the most innovative, while
Block E takes this to the final financial and market conclusion: the most innova-
tive have the best market share and the best profit performance relative to com-
petitors (although the market share results are much clearer).
This set of results provides us with a deeper understanding of the role
of information and knowledge in influencing specific organizational processes
and outcomes. It also provides us with an interesting managerial conclusion.
Authors such as Ruggles'^ have shown that a major stated issue for those
attempting to manage knowledge is the measurement of knowledge and
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determining which knowledge is useful. According to our work, this may be an
unnecessary—or at least not fatal—concern for some firms. Because we know
the antecedents (networking and absorptive capacity), germinators (decision
making quality), and outcomes (innovation) of knowledge creation, much of the
problem of knowledge systems can be resolved by focusing on creating the right
environment for these components to operate effectively. This, of course, does
not mean that firms shouldn't worry ahout database content and measuring
information and knowledge, but that it is just one component of the knowledge
management system.
In fact, recent work by Gold et al. indicated that knowledge management
should be seen from an organizational capabilities perspective.'^ That is, the
ability to apply knowledge in problem solving (i.e., process capability) is just
as important as the ability to store knowledge (i.e., infrastructure capability).
Indeed, this is one of the compelling lessons of the Buckman Laboratories exam-
ple." Buckman did not focus on content but rather on making sure that those
who needed access to sources of know-how got it and were capable of under-
standing what to do with it once they had their hands on it.
Knowledge Traps:
Lessons from the Management of Knowledge
Subsequent to the work described above, we also examined both quanti-
tatively (through internal surveys) and qualitatively (through interviews) the
knowledge management practices of six firms. These firms also represent a
cross-section of industries. Two of the firms were industrial in orientation wirh
large labor forces—one in automobile engine design and manufacturing and the
other in railway engineering design. Three were professional business service
organizations that were large in their respective markets and also respected for
their financial and service quality performance—one each in legal services, busi-
ness services, and executive search. The last firm was a small advertising part-
nership. In total, these firms generated another 357 survey responses and 150
interviews.
We observed a set of "knowledge traps" to which even the best firms
seemed to fall victim. These pitfalls are "managerial" in that they relate directly
to decisions (or non-decisions) made by managers who caught the knowledge
management bug but failed to recognize that knowledge management is a phi-
losophy about business operations, not a simple process that can be bolted onto
business models, as in the case of quality function deployment, business process
reengineering, or total quality management. Also, the intangibility of knowledge
means that the things that made QFD, BPR, and TQM popular—i.e., their mea-
surement capabilities—are absent. Without good metrics, managers of knowl-
edge-based firms traded measurement for gut instinct, and in the process they
allowed themselves to make some simple but critical errors. Following are eight
lessons to be learned from these knowledge traps.
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Lesson I: Formal databases must be treated as strategic tools
rather than mere storage facilities.
An organization's database subsystem can be an important repository of
the wealth of information that resides within the firm, provided that it is struc-
tured and designed for that purpose. We came across several examples where
firms had invested in formal systems that failed to develop into a strategic tool
for enhanced problem solving simply because: they were cumbersome to use;
their content was not useful or relevant enough; and insufficient effort was put
into transferring the intellectual capital from the people onto the system. More
formally, the database subsystem failed to merge effectively with the other
knowledge management subsystems—transfer, language, and network.
Both the business services and legal firms examined had in-house data-
base systems that were perceived to be both too complicated (for inputting as
well as retrieving data) and inefficient (in terms of the time taken to retrieve a
piece of information). More importantly, the information and knowledge stored
were not perceived as being comprehensive or sufficiently relevant. In the busi-
ness services firm, this was attributed to the fact that the people managing the
system did not possess adequate "industry or specialist knowledge" to enable
them to understand a particular client's problem nor did they possess the infor-
mation required to solve it. Finally (and this remains the most difficult aspect
of managing formal databases), there must be a concerted effort on part of the
organization to ensure that any part of knowledge that is codifiable is indeed
codified and captured. One of the business services firm's biggest challenges was
capturing the intellectual capital that fiowed from client projects. The difficulty
was the lack of time and incentives allocated for recording knowledge, as illus-
trated by one associate's statement: "No one is given time to actually do it. You
come off one client and move onto the next one. That Irecording] is the part
left undone. It just continues to be on your list and just never gets done. It's not
looked on as an important thing."
Lesson 2: Managing formal database systems per se does not
equate to knowledge management.
There is a major distinction between the database subsystem and the
knowledge management system. Database subsystems are important vehicles
for capturing information, but in order for these to be used effectively, they have
to be supported by a strong informal networking subsystem. This is because a
database subsystem is not a mechanism that develops in isolation. It needs to be
subsumed (and developed and augmented) within an organization's networking
and transfer subsystems. Firms with more comprehensive and knowledge-
friendly informal networking systems are better at generating know-how and the
innovation and performance outcomes that follow. These results echo McDer-
mott's argument that information technology cannot deliver knowledge man-
agement because human relationships are needed to share knowledge that is
neither obvious nor easy to document. "* Few managers know how to make the
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informal structures work. It is much easier to spend a million dollars on formal
database subsystems that no one really uses, or uses ineffectively, than to invest
in the informal networking and transfer subsystems that are essential for what
goes into and comes out of these databases. •
However, this does not imply that one must nurture informal networking
subsystems at the expense of formal systems. Rather, both complement one
another and must be developed concurrently. Strong informal linkages sup-
ported by comprehensive databases characterize an organizational environment
conducive to generating new ideas and innovation. Effective knowledge man-
agement involves managing both formal and informal systems and recognizing
that the effectiveness of one can benefit the other.
Lesson 3: Informal networking is an important source of knowledge,
but over-reliance on it can be detrimental
The importance of informal interactions has been argued by many as a
crucial element in knowledge exchange, particularly due to the tacit nature of
knowledge that makes it difficult for formal codification and transfer. Sociolo-
gists such as Granovetter argue that "economic action (like all action) is embed-
ded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than carried out by
atomized actors."'^ This is supported by the work of Nahapiet and Ghoshal^° and
Cohen and Fields^' who acknowledge the important role social capital plays in
the development of organizational knowledge and innovation. For many organi-
zations, informal channels of communication have been a rich source of infor-
mation and knowledge that cannot be found in company databases, manuals,
or newsletters. A director of the executive search firm in our sample regarded
informal networking as a must-have ingredient for his organization: "For this
organization to work effectively, you need to network and you need to network
across a range of areas within the business. I don't believe there are formal
channels that exist in a way that's easy for you to run your business, so you
need to have a lot of informal channels of communication."
We also found instances where informal channels have become the de
facto knowledge management system when formal channels have proved inade-
quate. The inefficiency of the formal database subsystem at the business services
firm resulted in many consultants adopting a "hunting and gathering" approach
to information and knowledge sourcing, relying on personal networks devel-
oped through previous projects or social interaction. In another example, our
research at the legal firm revealed that the grapevine had become a substitute
when formal communications had failed. Noted one manager at that firm: "The
formal communication channels are not strong, or limited in some respects. It's
probably not an organization which widely shares information about what's
going on, but the informal communication channels (i.e., the grapevine) works
fairly well."
Despite the prevalence and advantages of informal channels, there is
an inherent risk of spontaneity—that is, the risk of these informal interactions
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being too dependent on "chance meetings." This lack of structure within infor-
mal channels can result in important information being lost—there is no guar-
antee that an essential piece of information will be communicated to all relevant
parties. We found various instances where information sharing was random and
incidental. One attorney articulated how at his firm: "Information is shared
anecdotally and sometimes by sheer luck because sometimes you do it by walk-
ing around the floor and asking people. It's quite surprising what I have found
by sheer accident." This anecdotal sharing may work for smaller firms, but as
organizations grow in size, it becomes more and more random and people need
to rely on the strength of their personal networks. A principal at the business
services firm noted that information sharing was becoming increasingly unreli-
able as the firm experienced rapid growth, thus making it difficult to track the
knowledge base of the firm: "Information sharing within smaller project teams is
very good. Then comes the use of personal networks, and beyond that it is quite
difficult to find out who knows what and whom I should approach. So there is a
certain amount of luck involved."
Over-reliance on informal networks as the main source of information
and knowledge can be detrimental in the long run, especially for larger organi-
zations where knowing "who's who" becomes increasingly difficult. This can
be seen as a problem where people are unable to locate a particular source
of expertise within the firm. This can be counteracted by having in place an
effective formal database system that allows employees to search for a piece
of information or knowledge, or at least locate the person who may have that
knowledge. Hence, to reinforce the previous lesson, formal and informal systems
of exchange must co-exist to support each other. Another guard against the ran-
domness of informal networks (and hence the sharing of information and
knowledge) is simply to make them more structured.
Lesson 4: To ensure that informal networking is less susceptible
to randomness, it should he made more structured.
Because knowledge resides within the individual {or groups of individu-
als), the challenge for managers is to leverage that individual's knowledge across
the organization. This is particularly important when knowledge (or best prac-
tices) developed in one area of the organization can be applied and utilized in
other parts of the organization. All too often organizations fail to account for
factors that inhibiting knowledge transfer and diffusion within the firm.
In our research, we have come across many instances where solutions
or best practices developed in one part of the firm do not travel to other parts
where they can be re-applied—a reflection of what is sometimes called "internal
stickiness." Internal stickiness can be thought of as "the difficulty of transferring
knowledge within the organization" attributable to organizational structures
that promote a "silo" mentality,^^ a culture that values personal expertise, and
the lack of appropriate rewards and incentives for sharing of understanding.^^
Because the complexity of a problem-solving situation is usually embedded
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within group dynamics, it is common for a solution or a new piece of knowledge
to stay within the group whose members most easily understand it. Also, the
fast-paced working environment of many firms preclude any real opportunities
for people to interaa beyond their immediate work group or team, further
reducing the chances of cross-divisional sharing. This particular problem can be
seen as one of "localized (or divisionalized) problem solving," a phenomenon
that is quite prevalent among the firms that we have studied.
One of the main factors contributing to the problem is a lack of structured
time for knowledge sharing. As noted, the tacit nature of knowledge means that
it is most effectively shared or transferred through informal interpersonal inter-
actions. However, when there is no structured time scheduled for such purposes,
the sharing of knowledge remains ad hoc or accidental. A partner whom we
interviewed at the advertising agency commented on how lack of time had
worked against the general desire for knowledge sharing in his firm: "There's
lots of great little things that we've done for clients that we could share with
the rest of the agency and we haven't. It comes down to lack of time more than
anything, rather than the lack of will to do it." A manager at the automobile
firm also alluded to the prohlem of lack of structured time in bemoaning how
"People find it difficult to get together and share. Lack of time is often the
excuse, but what is contributing to our lack of time is our lack of structure to
time."
For companies facing a fast-paced working environment, this lack of
structured time may be even more detrimental as new knowledge becomes lost
and mistakes (when not dealt with in a timely fashion) are perpetuated. At the
advertising firm, employees were not learning from mistakes simply because
they had not instituted regular strurtured meetings to serve that purpose. The
core output of an advertising agency is highly dependent on different areas of
expertise—e.g., client management, creative design, and production. This multi-
disciplinary work environment, coupled with a fast-paced work culture, creates
a need for more regular and structured "de-briefing" sessions where people have
the opportunity to discuss mistakes made and lessons learned from their pro-
jeas. As a director at the agency described the current situation: "We sit down
every couple of months and look at mistakes instead of learning instantaneously
from something that went wrong. I think it's important to share these things as
you're going along, rather than analyze three months down the line when it's
too late." An engineer at the railway organization expressed similar concerns
that his firm needed to encourage learning by "having internal dedicated time
for formal sharing of knowledge."
Opportunities for knowledge sharing are critical to developing a transfer
subsystem and come in many forms—e.g., weekly presentations, breakfast meet-
ings, project de-briefs, or mentoring schemes. Merely having these forums on
the books is not enough; what is more important is an explicit intention to build
in the time for employees to learn from each other. A director at the advertising
firm emphasized the significance of regular informal interactions that are
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T A B L E I , Assessment of Organizational Incentives for Knowledge Absorption
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
N
3.29
3.67
2.25
la
4.54
3.74
3.66
45
4.95
4.60
4.88
94
3.80
3.38
3.11
85
4.90
3.93
4.04
51
4.73
3.45
3.64
64
designed for employees to learn from each other: "I think it would be good if all
the creative people (even if just once a week) all got together and discussed the
projects they're working on and got each other's opinions and feedback—just a
bit of creative interaction."
These examples reflect both the importance and difficulty of implement-
ing structured knowledge sharing. Most organizations exist in a world of tight
schedules, multiple projects, and quick turnaround time. In this environment,
meeting client deadlines is given priority ahead of occasions for general learning
and knowledge sharing. However, organizations often suffer the consequences
of this oversight when they fail to capture and share the intellectual capital that
is produced from the projects they undertake. This is especially true for service
organizations where only a small proportion of their intangible know-how can
be codified and the more tacit components will be lost if not shared via regular,
structured interpersonal interactions.
Lesson 5; Senior management may not know the true state
of their firm's knowledge systems.
There is a distinct difference between the perceptions of senior managers
and their subordinates of the efficacy of their knowledge management systems.
With regard to formal database subsystems, senior managers invariably look on
the IT systems positively but with a mea culpa related to their own failure to use
them effectively. Junior managers are cynical about the systems but much more
positive about their own abilities to use them to their own benefit. With regard
to the less-tangible management development activities within the firms—i.e.,
knowledge-sharing practices, training schemes, and keeping abreast of the latest
products or industry trends—we found an interesting discrepancy between the
perceptions of senior managers and the more junior staff. Senior managers have
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T A B L E 2 . Organizational Incentives for Knowledge Absorption Relative
to Individual Activities
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
N
0.65
0.96
1.02
18
0.16
0.93
0.34
45
- 0 . 1 8
-0 .01
0.31
94
0.91
1.03
1.16
85
- 0 . 4 7
0.75
0.23
51
0.15
0.36
0.40
64
a higher perception of the effectiveness of organizational policies, as compared
to lower-level executives. Tahle 1 shows the ratings (on a scale from I to 7)
given to the organizational incentives for various information and knowledge
development activities.^^ For each case study firm, the survey respondents are
divided into three levels—Level 1 being directors and senior managers. Level 2
consisting of middle management, and Level 3 being predominantly team lead-
ers or officers. Results show that for all measures of organizational incentives,
Level 1 managers gave the highest ratings in all cases {with the exception of the
advertising firm where Level 2 managers rated higher). The main insight to be
gained from this result is that the attitudes of senior managers are not necessar-
ily the only or best measures of the success of any knowledge management
system. . ,
Lesson 6: You can't teach old dogs new tricks.
A finding related to lesson 5 is that firms fail to recognize that certain
individuals are either innately unable to absorb new knowledge or their per-
sonal and organizational incentives make them unlikely to ever want to do so.
For example, one firm had invested enormous amounts of money in knowledge
and training activities, to little avail. The problem was not the effectiveness of
these activities—they were good—but the fact that the average worker in the
company had been working there since their late teens and had been on the
shop floor for 25 years. For a worker in this company, risk taking was dis-
couraged since the level of engineering precision required for success was
uncompromisingly high and there was no personal reward for absorbing any
new knowledge other than that directly related to these precise requirements.
Table 2 repeats the breakdown seen in Table 1 with an additional twist by
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representing the difference between the individual's evaluation of the organi-
zational incentives relative to their own efforts and ability.^' The fact that the
individuals consider their abilities higher, on average, than the organizational
incentives is not surprising. What is more surprising is the fact that the highest
managerial level is always the lowest on this measure. In the case of all six firms.
Level 2 and Level 3 managers rate their abilities much higher relative to organi-
zational incentives than do Level 1 executives. Given that Table 1 showed these
managers rate the organizational incentives highest, we have an interesting
problem: senior managers are more likely to believe in the value of organization
incentives (which they no doubt instituted) while being far less likely to engage
in the activities those incentives are meant to encourage. Middle and junior
managers helieve in the incentives less, but still engage in active knowledge-
absorbing activities (most likely because it is good for their own career
development).
Lesson 7: Unless carefully managed, knowledge is a dark power.
A major problem for all the firms in our sample is how to generate
knowledge that can be capitalized on for the firm. Knowledge does not reside
in databases and (legal issues of intellectual capital ownership aside) information
is at best a comparative advantage for the organization. Knowledge resides in
individuals and there is always the problem of who gets the rents from its uti-
lization—a fact reinforced in more organizations with "siloed" organizational
structures that promote a culture of personal expertise and direct billing respon-
sibility. In two of the firms studied, we came across instances where knowledge
absorption at the individual level (predominantly through informal personal
networks) did not contribute to the pool of knowledge available to the organiza-
tion as a whole and most of the rents went directly to the individual (sometimes
even to the detriment of the firm). In the executive search firm, a turnover rate
of nearly 40% per year in consultants created a serious problem in maintaining
consistency of relationships with corporate clients, and it reduced the likelihood
that employees would invest in firm-specific know-how. One attorney in the
law firm saw this quite clearly: "There is also a culture that is a real hindrance
to the sharing of knowledge. I think it comes from some people believing that
knowledge is power and because people's remuneration is very typically based
on billings, people will hang on to clients and knowledge and not want to
share it."
The solution to this problem is daunting but not insurmountable. It is
intertwined with the nature of the transfer and networking subsystems and with
where the employee's loyalty lies. In the case of the advertising agency, business
services company, law firm, and executive search firm, the employees are quite
customer-focused, rely very heavily on the customer for information and know-
how, and generally put loyalty to the customer over loyalty to the firm. The fact
that they do so is a conscious policy of their organizations, and effective sharing
needs to be considered in light of this. As long as knowledge sharing can be
144 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 44, NO. 4 SUMMER 2002
Knowledge Management: Philosophy, Processes, and Pitfalls
shown to improve a specific executive's relationship with his or her clients, it
is more likely to occur and will indeed be sought out. However, in cases where
information or knowledge sharing is less tied up with the day-to-day business
objectives, formal transfer and networking are less valuable (and more difficult
to institute) because the holder of the knowledge needs to understand and trust
the receiver of the knowledge. Bob Buckman calls this "virtual trust."^^ In the
case of the engineering and rail services companies, this is less relevant, as
knowledge sharing is not as firmly embedded in their work processes and hence
formal administrative intervention is more likely to be effective.
Lesson 8: Creativity in problem solving is the main driver of new
knowledge creation and innovation, but it needs to be
supported by appropriate mechanisms.
Creativity is the main driver in new knowledge creation and the genera-
tion of innovative outputs. Those firms with the biggest bang from their ability
to source and absorb knowledge and information are those that apply it
creatively. Because it is in an industry that demands originality, the advertising
firm in our sample is well equipped with creative individuals. However, the
biggest challenge facing the firm is a lack supporting mechanisms that allow the
firm to fully capitalize on its creative potential (i.e., structured time for develop-
ing and sharing new ideas). As a manager at the firm explains, "There is a lot
of ability to be innovative, but it boils down to a lack of time. Most people here
would be more than happy if they had more time to come up with new ideas
and be more proactive with the clients." The executive search firm faces a simi-
lar problem whereby its incentive structures have prevented the full realization
of its creative talents. According to a director of the firm, "One thing that we
have is people who are capable. It's not a question of capability; it's a question of
what is rewarded. If everything is based upon outcomes Ifinancial outcomes and
transactions], then it's in everyone's interests not to worry about quality and just
focus on outcomes. We've never been comfortable taking people out of the rev-
enue stream and saying forget about your billings, we just want you to develop
this new product." When creativity is allowed to flourish, it leads to new knowl-
edge and greater innovation. However, it also needs supporting mechanisms to
channel that creativity into more effective decision-making processes.
Conclusion: Knowledge Management
Can Be Measured Through Innovative Outputs
A lot of the initial managerial thinking on knowledge management arose
from the IT literature"^' and the sharing and use of data. On the other side,
notions of intangible knowledge stocks^^ and their role in fostering innovation"
have emphasized the role of transfer, understanding, and learning. Our research
shows that knowledge management is best understood and managed from the
perspective of innovation and intangible asset management rather than IT
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management. Indeed, the impact of knowledge management systems on perfor-
mance relates primarily to the organization's ability to innovate—either through
improved processes or improved products and services. Rather than being a new
field of management with its own special laws, knowledge management sits well
within our understanding of what drives change and motivates innovation.
CASE STUDY:
Managing Know-HowADCO
"ADCO" [pseudonym], a medium-sized media design-and-execution company, had achieved
phenomenal growth since its inception in 1990. With this grawth came some unexpected
challenges, not the least of which was the fact that growth created pressures to design systems
to replace the hands-on management style typical of small start-ups. For Paul Royale. one of
the founding partners, the main problems ADCO was grappling with were communication,
lack of respect, lack of competences, and the lack of a post-project review process. His eyes
were opened to the idea of knowledge being regarded as a currency that was worth some-
thing to other people.The problem was to encourage people to share the knowledge.This
was the charge given to him by the seven partner/ov^'ners.
Knowledge sharing was particularly important to a company such as ADCO that operated in
a deadline-driven business where you simply have to do "what the clients want... when they
want it." Whereas client management was one of ADCO's key strengths, managing internal
relationships took something of a back seat. Working well with clients did not necessarily
extend to working well with colleagues. As one director noted, "We all work well with clients,
but I think internally we are absolutely appalling at sharing how we work.. . ways of working
smarter" As ADCO grew, the informal networking between the partners that made it operate
smoothly was put under stress,
Paul Royale found that five levels of knowledge were critical to the agency's success.The first
was technical expertise—how to make effective videos and other promotional material.The
second was praject management^the understanding of what it takes to put a major project
together for a client.The third was understanding client needs and delivering marketing value
for clients (which has historically been the competence that sets ADCO apart from most of its
competitors).The fourth was the ability to seek out and absorb "what's new," fresh and trendy
in the industry.The fifth, and perhaps the least important, was tbe storage and retrieval of on-
going internal knowledge development
Recognizing that a firm the size of ADCO (with 51 full-time employees and an equal number
of temporary workers) could not afford complex database systems, Paul Royale focused his
efforts on developing an informal networking and transfer systems that substituted for expen-
sive IT and fit better with the company's "creative" focus.The result was three initiatives.
• The Afler-Action Review process was aimed at facilitating more constructive feedback and
eliminating mistakes after the completion of each pnDJect.The business directors decided
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to try it for a period of 3 months to see if it worked. As one director emphasized the
importance of such reviews, especially their timing:" We used to sit down every couple of
months and look at mistakes instead of learning instantaneously ftX)m something that vyent
wrong. 1 think it's important to share these things as you're going along, rather than analyz-
ing them three months down the line when it's too late."
• Show-and-Tell allows people to do a short presentation of work that has been done for
certain clients to the rest ofthe agency In addition, senior managers give 20- to 30-minute
talks on areas they fett would benefit the agency as a whole.The topics discussed have
been fairly broad, such as life skiiis or relationship management skills,
• informal Brainstorming Sessions have been instituted at the initiation of large client pro-
jects. Part ofthe impetus behind these meetings was the failure of communication
between the different client groups.This lack of information sharing was highiighted when
the one team wanted to use "heat reveal" promotional material. Because nobody on the
team had any experience with the technoiogy, they went through a long learning process.
In fact, it took severai weeks of painful and expensive research. In the end, the team found
a company that specialized in developing heat-reveal promotional material. When the
company was contacted, the team found out that another group at ADCO had worked
with this same company several months before on a promotion for another client.
These informal structures were criticai to ADCO's success.They systematized meetings and
interactions, avoided the failure to reuse relevant information, and highlighted the sources of
knowledge inside the firm. Although many in the company bemoaned the fact that most ofthe
larger mainstream agencies had research departments or resource iibraries that kept them up
to date, it was clear that ADCO could not afford to operate such a system and that informal
development was more efficient However; this did not mean that they ignored more formal
database systems. Plans were on the books to develop a database of detailed information on
each employee as a way of encouraging peopie to get to know each other more as well as
becoming a source of business-related information. Plans were also in place to update ADCO's
current database—a centralized repository of client names, contact numbers, and other super-
ficial information that is updated by the client service people responsible for their respective
clients. However given the "creative" and "informal" nature of ADCO's culture it was felt that
such systems could not replace the more humanistic approach to knowledge management
This creates a convenient solution for managers trying to deal with the
intangibility of knowledge. Most critically, managers can measure the change in
innovative outputs that flow from knowledge management strategies and prac-
tices. Although not perfect, such simple thinking has been shown to dramati-
cally increase the respect for knowledge management, increase the innovative
performance of firms, and ultimately filter through to the bottom line.
Knowledge management systems operate very much on a contingency,
"horses for courses" platform. The level of emphasis on the various subsystems
differs quite dramatically from firm to firm, even though the basic problem is the
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL 44, NO. 4 SUMMER 2002 147
Knowledge Management Philosophy, Processes, and Pitfalls
same: how to generate and capitalize on knowledge. This is emphasized in the
case of the advertising agency, "ADCO" {see sidebar). What this case illustrates is
the difficulty faced by an in-between firm—an organization too large for purely
informal systems to operate but too small to afford complex and formal corpo-
rate systems. The firm was successful in that it understood what it needed to
know and tried to develop systems that achieved that.
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